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The origins of Euroscepticism in German-speaking Switzerland
TOBIAS THEILER
Department of Politics, University College Dublin, Ireland
Abstract. This article examines why the electorate in German-speaking Switzerland has
consistently opposed joining the European Union. It first shows that the region scores highly
on a range of general correlates of negative attitudes towards European integration.
However, this is compounded by more idiosyncratic factors, above all by the German-
speaking Swiss’ peculiar political and cultural position. On the one hand, as Swiss they
belong to a state that lacks a single national culture, is defined in civic and institutional rather
than cultural terms, and therefore appears more vulnerable in the face of the European
Union’s own civic and institutional ambitions. On the other hand, as Swiss-Germans, they
belong to a cultural and linguistic region whose cultural boundaries are relatively fragile
and lack institutional backup and articulation. Caught in this identitive double bind, the
Swiss-German electorate has developed an underlying sense of vulnerability and a desire
to limit exposure to the outside world.
Introduction
If the European Union (EU) had a favourite country it would probably be
Switzerland. After all, of all the countries in Europe, Switzerland embodies
most closely what the EU wants to be: multilingual, multicultural, wealthy,
stable and democratic, with overarching institutions and symbols that bind
together a culturally diverse citizenry. Duly impressed by the country’s cre-
dentials, many champions of European integration refer to the Swiss confed-
eration with almost ritualistic regularity. From Denis de Rougemont (1985) to
Jürgen Habermas (1992) to Joseph Weiler (1996), they see in Switzerland a
kind of proto-EU en miniature or at least a worthy source of political inspi-
ration for the European project.
Yet while the EU is fond of Switzerland (or, at any rate, the concept of
Switzerland), many Swiss are decidedly less fond of the EU. Apart from a
handful of microstates, Switzerland is the only Continental West European
country that has so far refused to join either the EU or the European 
Economic Area (EEA). Popular hostility towards the EU is far stronger in
Switzerland than in most other European countries. If Swiss voters had to vote
on EU membership today, they would almost certainly reject it, just as they
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defeated their government’s proposal to join the EEA more than a decade
ago.
At the same time, opposition to the EU among the Swiss electorate is
highly uneven. More so than almost any other issue, ‘Europe’ has produced
tensions between the two main language groups. These tensions first came fully
to the fore during the ill-fated EEA referendum in the early 1990s and have
persisted ever since (Kriesi et al. 1993). Among the country’s French-
speaking population (referred to as ‘Romands’ inside Switzerland), a small
majority of the electorate favours EU membership (currently around 52 per
cent). Among their German-speaking counterparts, by contrast, support for
EU membership hovers at around 32 per cent (see Haltiner et al. 2003:
Chapter 8). Given that the German-speaking Swiss outnumber the Romands
by more than three to one, Switzerland is likely to stay out of the EU for the
foreseeable future.1
The continued determination of the Swiss-German electorate to eschew
EU membership has important consequences, both for Switzerland’s relations
with its neighbours and for the relationship between its linguistic communi-
ties. In its external relations, the Swiss government is forced to perform a con-
tinuously difficult balancing act. Presiding over a small landlocked country low
in natural resources and highly dependent on foreign trade, it must seek a sub-
stantial degree of economic integration with the rest of the continent. Yet, at
the same time, it must do this without being seen to endanger Switzerland’s
political autonomy, lest it frighten an ever-suspicious Swiss-German electorate
and trigger backlashes at the polls (Sciarini et al. 2001).
Meanwhile, inside Switzerland, the split over ‘Europe’ has strained rela-
tions between French- and German-speakers – not to the extent of threaten-
ing the country’s survival, but enough to tarnish Switzerland’s erstwhile image
as an island of multicultural bliss. Ever since the defeat of the EEA referen-
dum in December 1992, the rift between the two main language groups over
the issue has remained a central topic in public debate. Many Swiss-Germans
concede that their refusal to take part in the European integration process has
put Switzerland’s own internal integration at risk. This has engendered a sense
of unease and guilt towards the French-speaking minority, outweighed only by
a continued aversion to joining the EU.
This article examines why a large majority of the electorate in German-
speaking Switzerland opposes joining the EU. It begins by arguing that the
region scores highly on a range of general correlates of negative attitudes
towards European integration: it is wealthy, ‘northern’, has a successful 
political history and constitutes the numerically dominant group in a multi-
cultural state. However, this is compounded by more idiosyncratic factors 
that derive from the peculiar political and cultural position of the German-
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speaking Swiss. On the one hand, as Swiss, Swiss-Germans belong to a state
that lacks a single ‘thick’ national culture, is defined in civic and institutional
rather than cultural terms and thus appears more vulnerable in the face of the
EU’s own civic and institutional ambitions. On the other hand, as Swiss-
Germans, they belong to a cultural and linguistic region whose cultural bound-
aries are relatively fragile and lack institutional backup and articulation.
Caught in this identitive double bind, the Swiss-German electorate has devel-
oped an underlying sense of vulnerability and a desire to limit exposure to the
outside world. Its reluctance to participate in the European integration
process is one sign of this.
The search for explanations
At first glance, the Swiss-German aversion to EU membership seems puzzling
given that many of the most common causes of opposition to European inte-
gration in other parts of Western Europe fail to explain it adequately. This
applies, for instance, to economic explanations. While some sectors of the Swiss
economy (such as agriculture) would likely suffer if the country joined the EU,
almost all economists believe that, on balance, Switzerland would economi-
cally benefit from closer integration with its neighbours (Hauser 1996). At any
rate, Switzerland’s overall economic position is not significantly different from
that of other small, wealthy and trade-dependent West European countries
that have found EU membership economically beneficial.
Nonetheless, many Swiss believe that EU membership would bring eco-
nomic harm and these perceptions are statistically correlated to anti-EU sen-
timent (Christin & Trechsel 2001). Yet in and of itself this does not suggest the
direction of causality between the two attitudes. On the face of it, it is equally
plausible to assume that among Swiss-Germans a negative view of the EU
stimulates fears of economic loss from membership rather than vice versa.
After all, French-speaking Switzerland is economically very similar to the
German part and thus would be similarly affected by EU membership, yet it
has much higher levels of support for the EU. In sum, ‘economic fear’ expla-
nations show that economic anxieties exist among Swiss-German EU oppo-
nents, but fail to demonstrate that they cause rather than merely reflect
negative perceptions of the EU.
Elite-centred explanations also fail to convince. The Swiss-German elec-
torate’s hostility to joining the EU is not a reflection of prevailing elite
opinion, given that most political and economic elites from across the politi-
cal spectrum favour EU membership. Three of the four coalition parties in
power since the Second World War embrace EU membership as a foreign
the origins of euroscepticism in german-speaking switzerland
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policy objective (albeit with varying degrees of enthusiasm). Only the fourth
– the right-of-centre Swiss People’s Party – has an important Eurosceptic wing.
The mass media, too, are overwhelmingly in favour of EU membership, as are
most opinion leaders in trade unions, employers’ federations and the power-
ful financial and manufacturing sectors. Mass, not elite, preferences keep
Switzerland out of the EU.
Third, explanations that focus on supposed ideological divergences or value
gaps between the Swiss-German polity and its European neighbours are also
unconvincing given that few such gaps exist. Switzerland and its neighbours
practice broadly similar forms of liberal welfare capitalism. They have, more-
over, similar demographic and socioeconomic characteristics that range from
falling rates of childbirth and church attendance to rising levels of overseas
travel and tertiary education (see Bundesamt für Statistik 2003). Moreover,
value surveys and popular referendums regularly confirm that public attitudes
on many social issues also broadly converge on the West European average,
on subjects ranging from children’s rights and abortion to gay marriage 
and recreational drug consumption. In short, there is nothing to make the
Swiss-Germans so socially, culturally or demographically different from their
European neighbours as to provide an ‘obvious’ explanation for their desire
to shun the EU.
There remains the most frequently invoked explanation for the Swiss-
German stance towards European integration. It postulates that the Swiss
electorate shares a deep-rooted commitment to Switzerland’s political insti-
tutions (above all the ‘holy trinity’ of federalism, neutrality and direct democ-
racy) and fears that EU membership would weaken these institutions. This
explanation comes closer to the core of the matter. After all, as is shown below,
many EU opponents insist that membership would be incompatible with
Switzerland’s political traditions. Moreover, neutrality, federalism and direct
democracy alike continue to enjoy strong popular support across the language
divide (see Haltiner et al. 2003: Chapter 9).
Yet herein precisely lies the paradox. On average, the French-speaking
Swiss are roughly as attached to Switzerland’s defining institutions as are their
German-speaking counterparts, yet display much higher levels of support for
EU membership. This in turn seems to suggest that the Francophone Swiss
electorate does not perceive European integration as a threat to these insti-
tutions to the same extent as German-speakers. In short, what emerges once
more from this is the problem of ‘reverse attitude causality’ discussed earlier.
Those who fear that the EU will undermine Switzerland’s political institutions
and traditions might well be driven by negative perceptions of the EU, rather
than vice versa.
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In sum, the four seemingly ‘obvious’ explanations fail adequately to
account for the Swiss-German rejection of the EU. We need more subtle
accounts that go beyond the statistical linking of attitudinal data and thus
suggest causality rather than mere correlation. Two broad approaches poten-
tially meet this criterion. The first tries to account for the particular with ref-
erence to the general. It identifies a range of variables that throughout postwar
Western Europe have helped to predict whether a given country or popula-
tion opposes European integration. It then assesses how many of these 
variables apply to the Swiss-German case, and thus whether Swiss-German
Euroscepticism can be explained with reference to a broader empirical
pattern. The second approach, by contrast, is more interpretative. It focuses
on the social, cultural and political particularities of German-speaking
Switzerland. It seeks to ascertain whether there is something peculiar to the
condition of being a German-speaking Swiss that engenders negative attitudes
towards European integration. In what follows, I begin with the first approach
and then turn to the second. Concluding that both approaches offer impor-
tant insights, I suggest that opposition to EU membership in German-
speaking Switzerland is both part of a wider pattern and thrives on factors
peculiar to Swiss-German society.
‘Pattern’ explanations
Opposition to European integration is often predictable – that is, we can 
identify a range of criteria that help determine whether or not a given 
country or population group is reluctant to participate in the European 
integration process. None of these variables is a reliable predictor in and of
itself. Instead, their effect is cumulative: the more criteria apply to a given
society, the greater is the likelihood that large sections within it oppose EU
membership.
The first predictor is geographic location and cultural background – that is,
whether a given population belongs to the ‘northern’ or ‘southern’ part of the
EU, and thus whether its cultural origins are mainly Anglo-Saxon or 
‘Germanic’ on the one hand or ‘Latin’ on the other. On average, those in the
former category are more leery of European integration than those in the
latter. It is not readily apparent why this should be so, and the academic lit-
erature has done surprisingly little to explore it. The cosmopolitan influence
of Catholicism on Europe’s ‘Latins’ and the roots of most EU ‘founding
fathers’ in Catholic Christian Democracy might be obvious starting points for
an explanation.2 Whatever the cause, geography-cum-cultural background is a
the origins of euroscepticism in german-speaking switzerland
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strong predictor. On issues ranging from EU enlargement to institutional and
functional expansion, ‘southerners’ are, on the whole, more EU-friendly than
their ‘northern’ counterparts. Likewise, in ‘southern’ Member States public
support for EU membership has consistently been above the European
average, as has been the proportion of citizens who claim to identify partially
as ‘Europeans’ (for comparative time-series data see the bi-annual Euro-
barometer surveys (1973–present).
Political history is the second predictor. Countries with a successful politi-
cal legacy (i.e., stable, democratic, able to protect national autonomy and so
on) are on average less keen on European integration than those whose politi-
cal legacy is less proud. A rationale for this is not hard to come by: one is more
reluctant to surrender or modify something if it performs well and has done
so in the past. Pride and confidence in one’s political system is a strong reason
for wanting to leave it untouched (see Sànchez-Cuenca 2000).
The third predictor is wealth. On average, the poorer a country is, the
stronger its support for European integration. This, too, has a plausible expla-
nation, provided one accepts that economic self-interest helps shape political
preferences. Overall, European integration has economically benefited both
rich and poor Member States, but for various reasons (formal redistributive
mechanisms between Member States being one of them), it is generally
acknowledged to have disproportionately benefited the poor over the rich.
This is borne out by the relative rates of economic growth of different member
states since their accession. By extension, richer countries experience weaker
economic binding factors to the EU than do their poorer counterparts and are
thus more prone to be swayed by other considerations that might militate
against EU membership.
The final predictor applies to ethnically, culturally or linguistically plural
states, where the numerically dominant group tends to be less keen on Euro-
pean integration than those in the minority. This is the case in the United
Kingdom, for example, where public opinion in Scotland and Wales has con-
sistently been much more EU-friendly than in England. The same is true for
the Catalans in Spain, the Walloons in Belgium and so forth. This, too, has an
intuitively plausible explanation. By definition, in democratic states, dominant
groups hold more power than minority communities and thus have more to
lose by surrendering or ‘pooling’ some of it within the EU. For minorities, by
contrast, the emergence of ‘Brussels’ as an alternative locus of political author-
ity is often perceived as an opportunity to counterbalance one ‘foreign master’
against another and thus to benefit from a net growth in political influence.
What is more, over the past twenty years, the EU has tried hard to court
minorities by, for instance, granting regional authorities a limited involvement
in the legislative process and by instituting various ‘Europe of the regions’ pro-
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grammes, minority language charters and so on (see Nagel 2002; more gener-
ally Jones & Keating 1995).
As was suggested, none of these four variables is a perfect predictor of atti-
tudes towards the EU, but their impact is cumulative. And this in turn puts the
Swiss-German case in perspective. More so than any other population group
in Western Europe, German-speaking Switzerland ranks highly on all four
main correlates of Euroscepticism. It belongs to the ‘northern’ and ‘Germanic’
part of Europe, has a successful political history, is very wealthy and consti-
tutes the numerically dominant region in a multicultural state. In contrast 
to the French-speaking Swiss to whom two of the four main predictors of
opposition to the EU do not apply, German-speakers rank highly on all four
dimensions.
To look at German-speaking Switzerland from this perspective makes its
opposition to the EU appear less exceptional, less odd and less paradoxical.
It is exceptional in so far as the region combines all four main predictors of
opposition to the EU. However, these predictors themselves derive from a
pattern that applies throughout Western Europe. Moreover, such an approach
suggests causality rather than mere correlation since all four predictors
(except perhaps the ‘Latin versus Germanic’ gap) have relatively simple and
intuitively plausible explanations.
The above account, then, makes for a useful analytical backdrop against
which to examine the Swiss-German case. Yet, at the same time, it should not
prevent us from casting our explanatory net more widely. Is there something
more peculiar to the Swiss-German condition that helps account for its reluc-
tance to participate in the European integration process, something to com-
plement and reinforce the factors just discussed? The remainder of this article
focuses on two such factors: first, the civic nature of Swiss self-definitions and,
second, the political, cultural and linguistic position of the German-speaking
Swiss. The first explanation draws on Switzerland’s status as ‘state without a
culture’; the second on the Swiss-Germans’ predicament as a ‘culture without
a state’. Individually and still more so in combination, both factors drive the
Swiss-German electorate away from the EU.
Switzerland as a ‘state without a culture’
Most Member States of the EU are self-conceived nation-states. They are
bounded units in which the political, social and cultural converge. In an ideal-
typical world of ideal-typical nation-states, each culture has ‘its’ state and each
state has ‘its’ culture; social, political and cultural boundaries are congruent
and reinforce each other (Gellner 1983). In reality, of course, most states in
the origins of euroscepticism in german-speaking switzerland
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Europe and beyond do not satisfy the ideal-type in that they have minorities
of various kinds. Moreover, even where the congruence between state and
nation is very close, this typically owes less to a ‘natural fit’ than to fervent cul-
tural nation building by political elites, using instruments that range from
schools and the mass media to military conscription and genocide. In Europe,
as elsewhere, states made nations more so than the other way around (Gellner
1983; Hobsbawm 1994).
Nevertheless, once an approximate congruence between state and nation,
politics and culture had emerged, it became central to maintaining national
identifications. In the language of social psychology, it meant that culture had
become a marker for social categorization (Tajfel 1981; Hogg & Abrams 1988).
Political elites could now rely on culture to help define and symbolize state
boundaries, turning the state into a cultural container that defined and pro-
tected ‘what it meant to be’ French, Italian, Swedish or whatever. Citizens also
experienced their state-cum-national community as culturally homogenous at
the inside and culturally differentiated from the outside. Just as the state
defined culture, culture became a defining principle of the state and the two
came to mutually reinforce each other (Brubaker 1996: Chapter 1).
The potential of culture to function as boundary marker has important con-
sequences for the participation of culturally homogenous (or relatively
homogenous) nation-states in the EU. It means that the laws, institutions and
political traditions of the state can be modified by, or even partially submerged
in, the integration process (or, at any rate, be perceived to experience such a
fate) without endangering the survival of the national polity as a salient psy-
chological category of belonging for its members. The state may weaken and
some political and economic boundaries might get blurred, but for as long as
it is culturally distinctive the polity remains intact (Wæver & Kelstrup 1993;
Wæver 1996; Theiler 2003).
All this helps explain why in Western Europe a growing economic and
political interconnectedness between different populations and the rise of
‘Brussels’ as a political centre has not been accompanied by parallel develop-
ments in the cultural and identitive realms – contrary to what some theorists
had believed possible at the outset (e.g., Deutsch 1954). In fact, not only has
the nation-state remained salient as a cultural unit and locus of social identi-
fication, but the past decade has seen a growing emphasis on national cultural
particularities across the EU. Signs of this range from the growth of national-
istic and anti-immigrant parties in many EU Member States to a frequent 
preoccupation with protecting national food standards, languages, music and
television programming against foreign ‘contamination’ (Wæver 1996). The
same logic suggests why even otherwise EU-friendly electorates overwhelm-
ingly oppose EU involvement in socially and culturally sensitive areas such as
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cultural policy, the audiovisual sector and education (Theiler 1999). One can
more easily tolerate a (actual or perceived) weakening of economic and po-
litical boundaries if one still ‘has’ culture with which to define and distinguish
oneself as a community, and if one can protect internal cohesion and external
boundaries by substituting ‘more culture’ for ‘less state’.
Not so in Switzerland. Unlike most of its European neighbours,
Switzerland is not a nation-state. It does not have a single national language
and it lacks unifying myths of shared ethnic origins. Consequently, the Swiss 
cannot define themselves in ‘thicker’ cultural terms and cannot use culture as
a boundary marker and unifying glue. Instead, the concept of Switzerland is
constituted and signified by a range of institutional-cum-civic norms and tra-
ditions – mainly, of course, neutrality, federalism and direct democracy 
(Sciarini et al. 2001). These are backed up by a limited assortment of – equally
civic – symbols and rituals, and by a ‘thin’ political mythology that centres on
the recurring themes of Switzerland as a ‘nation of will’ (Willensnation) and
of Swiss heroes securing the country’s independence against predatory foreign
powers – from Wilhelm Tell to the officers of the Second World War (Schmid
1981; Bendix 1992; Hettling 1998; Kriesi 1999; more generally, Kriesi 1998;
Linder 1998).
The civic foundations of the Swiss state are reflected in the strong attach-
ment on the part of its electorate to its political practices and institutions. They
suggest why this attachment does not merely grow out of the perceived prac-
tical and normative value of these practices and institutions, but also flows
from their role as communal signifiers. For instance, while neutrality is in part
valued for its presumed historical role in securing Switzerland’s independence,
its popularity is not simply reducible to this. Instead, surveys show time and
again that for many Swiss belonging to a neutral country is a central ingredi-
ent to ‘what it means to be Swiss’. Swiss political scientists have termed this
the ‘identity function’ of neutrality (Haltiner et al. 2003: Chapter 9; Sciarini et
al. 2001). Initially a survival strategy, neutrality has migrated into deeper ter-
ritories of affective significance. Over time, it became a ‘condensation symbol’
(Merleman 1966) that signifies something much larger than its immediate sym-
bolic referent – the concepts of ‘Switzerland’ and ‘being Swiss’, in the sense of
belonging to a psychologically salient communal category that lacks ‘thicker’
cultural, linguistic or ethnic markers.
An important clarification is in order here. The (especially older) literature
on national identity sometimes equates the presumed ‘thickness’ of particular
national symbols (i.e., their degree of ethnic-cum-linguistic-cum-religious
‘content’) with their strength and persistence and with the salience and dura-
bility of corresponding communal identifications. Yet this equation is not
always valid, and the Swiss case illustrates this well. As in some other mainly
the origins of euroscepticism in german-speaking switzerland
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‘civic nations’ (such as, with some qualifications, the United States), in Switzer-
land overarching communal markers are ‘thin’ (i.e., mainly civic) but also
strong, and the communal identifications they sustain are equally stable and
salient. Theoretically, this is not inconsistent. Social psychologists and social
anthropologists have long shown that the ‘content’ of particular group markers
says nothing about the salience of corresponding group identifications (with
‘salience’ defined broadly as the proportion of the self which a given group
category occupies). ‘Everything’, in this rendering, ‘may be grist on the mill of
symbolism’ (Cohen 1989: 19, emphasis added). Seen in this light, Switzerland
does, indeed, support the claim by ‘constitutional patriotism’ theorists à la
Habermas that communal cohesion does not require a ‘thick’ ethnic, cultural
or linguistic base. In Switzerland, overarching communal markers are ‘thin’,
yet strong and highly salient.
Moreover, the ‘cultural’ and the ‘civic’ are not, of course, different ‘enti-
ties’. Instead, they are concepts referring to different forms of social practice
and identification that cannot be neatly decoupled: in Switzerland, as every-
where else, the ‘civic’ is to some extent also the ‘cultural’ and vice versa, and
the two stand in a dialectical relationship (see Auer 2004). Yet while the Swiss
state is thus neither ‘non-cultural’ nor ‘a-cultural’, it lacks many of the ‘thicker’
cultural attributes of its neighbours – above all, of course, a shared national
language. Perhaps terms such as ‘civic culture’, ‘thin culture’ or – most
famously in recent years – ‘constitutional patriotism’ best capture the Swiss
situation.
Nonetheless, the civic nature of its overarching communal signifiers means
that Switzerland’s position vis-à-vis the European integration process is over-
shadowed by a particular kind of vulnerability that sets it apart from its
‘thicker’, more monocultural neighbours. As was argued, the latter can more
easily tolerate a (actual or perceived) weakening of their political practices
and institutions, as long as they retain their cultural attributes as a source of
internal cohesion and external demarcation. The Swiss, by contrast, cannot do
this, given that Switzerland lacks a national culture in the ‘thick’ sense of the
term. In principle they could, of course, retreat into their respective local or
regional cultures, but such a move would weaken rather than strengthen the
Swiss polity at large, since language and culture is precisely what separates the
Swiss from each other. A threat to Switzerland’s civic foundations would
threaten the very concept of Switzerland itself, since civic foundations are all
it has. Herein, then, lies the crucial difference between Switzerland and most
of its European neighbours. Take away the German state and Germany still
somehow exists as a perceived cultural-cum-ethnic-cum-linguistic entity of
some sort; but take away Switzerland’s institutional and civic foundations and
Switzerland will be no more.
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Would, however, membership in the EU really threaten or even ‘take away’
neutrality, federalism and direct democracy? Many Swiss constitutional schol-
ars agree that it would probably not, especially if Switzerland managed to
secure the kinds of opt-outs and exemption clauses that other Member States
enjoy in a variety of areas (Hailbronner 1992; Cottier & Kopse 1998;Tanquerel
1991). Yet at a psychological level, the threat might well be real. If ‘being Swiss’
means harbouring allegiances to Switzerland’s civic practices and institutions,
and if joining the EU means acquiring – however weak and diffuse – alle-
giances to European practices and institutions (or at least joining a political
unit that lays claim to such allegiances), the potential for conflict or, at any
rate, perceptions of conflict exists. Acquiring something additional of the same
type implies the potential for competition and rivalry, and for having to down-
grade the status of the first in order to accommodate the second. Incidentally,
for this reason attempts to seduce the Swiss into the EU by pointing out that
the Union itself aspires to become some kind of Switzerland writ large may
well be counterproductive. For the Swiss polity, notions of civic similarity with
the EU will heighten, not assuage, identity-related fears.
Yet why does all this appear to affect mainly the German-speaking Swiss’
attitudes towards European integration? As was argued, attachment to
Switzerland’s civic pillars is strong on both sides of the linguistic divide, and
both language groups must define their ‘Swissness’ in civic rather than cultural
terms. Clearly, the French-speaking Swiss’ greater fondness for Europe does
not come at the expense of a lower attachment to Switzerland or a weaker
sense of ‘being Swiss’ (Métral 2001). Why, then, can the Francophone Swiss
reconcile the two concepts more easily than their German-speaking 
counterparts?
Part of the answer lies with the status of the French-speaking Swiss as, first,
a minority group that, second, belongs to Europe’s ‘Latin’ part. As was shown,
this means that two of the strongest general predictors of Euroscepticism do
not apply to the Francophone Swiss, whereas their German-speaking coun-
terparts meet all four. Following the ‘reverse causality’ logic discussed earlier,
generally more positive perceptions of the EU among French-speakers may in
turn reduce anxieties that the EU could pose a ‘civic threat’ to Switzerland.
This might then feed back into their overall attitudes towards the EU and
render these more favourable still, thus further lowering threat perceptions,
and so forth. If the French-speaking Swiss’ attitudes towards the EU are
caught in a ‘positive dialectic’ of this kind, those of the German-speakers 
might well be subjected to a similar logic in reverse. However, the difference
in attitudes between the two linguistic communities has yet another explana-
tion. It draws on the peculiar cultural and linguistic position of Swiss-German
society.
the origins of euroscepticism in german-speaking switzerland
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German-speaking Switzerland as a ‘culture without a state’
German-speaking Switzerland is in a cultural position that differs sharply from
its Francophone counterpart and is quite unlike that of any other population
in Europe. In seeking to account for the Euroscepticism of the Swiss-Germans,
few commentators have paid much attention to their cultural predicament and
few outside Switzerland grasp its full complexity. However, cultural variables
are an essential part of the explanation. The central issue is language.
Swiss-Germans from across all regions and social backgrounds are bilin-
gual in that they use both the Swiss-German and standard – or High – German
idioms. Swiss-German (which comes in several regional variants) is the lan-
guage of everyday interaction. Standard German, by contrast, has tradition-
ally dominated more formal and ‘official’ situations, from news bulletins on
the radio and school teaching to church sermons and speeches by Swiss-
German politicians in the federal parliament. Most importantly, Swiss-
German lacks a standardized written idiom. Apart from the odd piece of folk
poetry, local literature and private email, almost all writing is in High German.
Swiss-Germans rarely speak standard German but they almost always write
it. Accordingly, Swiss-Germans refer to High German as Schriftdeutsch – 
literally, ‘written German’ (for classic overviews, see Haas 1981, 2000 and
Siebenhaar & Wyler 1997; on the historical evolution of Swiss-German, see
Näf 2001; on the complex coexistence of Swiss-German, German and French
in Switzerland, see Knüsel 1994 and Wunderli 2001; also see Schläpfer 1994).
Over the past half century, the balance between Swiss-German and High
German has shifted in favour of the former. A Dialektwelle (‘dialect wave’)
swept Swiss-German into areas hitherto reserved for the standard version.
These include many official and semi-official settings such as news bulletins
on some private radio stations, church sermons, proceedings in some cantonal
legislatures and parts of the education sector. For linguists, all this has resulted
in a gradual shift away from the traditional social context dependent division
of labour between Swiss-German and High German (the former used in more
familiar contexts and the latter in more formal ones) towards a ‘medium
dependent’ diglossia. Oral communication is ever more strongly dominated
by Swiss-German, whereas High German remains the language of reading and
writing (Siebenhaar & Wyler 1997; Haas 2000). The growing use of Swiss-
German in oral communication originated in part with efforts by Swiss elites
to cultivate the idiom as part of a cultural self-differentiation strategy from
Nazi Germany. In subsequent decades, it was boosted by factors such as the
introduction of private radio and television stations and reform movements in
education. Beyond this, it thrives on a broader tendency in contemporary
Western cultures towards more informal and intimate forms of communica-
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tion and the extension ‘private’ communication patterns into areas formerly
perceived as ‘public’, ‘official’ and ‘hierarchical’ (Haas 2000; Siebenhaar &
Wyler 1997).
With no past or present attempts to standardize Swiss-German, linguistic
differences between Swiss-German regions (and often between different local-
ities within the same region) remain strong, to the point where for some lin-
guists the very notion of the Swiss-German idiom is problematic. All the same,
divergences in syntax, grammar and vocabulary (though not to nearly the same
degree, in accent and pronunciation) have started to weaken somewhat and –
albeit unevenly – to converge on a more ‘regionalized’ Swiss-German idiom
(Haas 1981, 2000; Siebenhaar & Wyler 1997; Christen 1998; Wunderli 2001).
This stemmed in part from a growth in intercantonal trade, mobility and mar-
riages, as well as from the greater use of Swiss-German on radio and televi-
sion. A further factor was the absorption by Swiss-German of new words and
expressions, both from High German and (more recently and to a lesser
degree) from English (Haas 2000).
Swiss-German’s surge at the expense of High German has had two direct
consequences. First, it meant that Swiss-German became less like a conven-
tional dialect and more like a ‘full’ language, in so far as one follows most
modern linguists in distinguishing between language and dialect above all by
their social position and by the range of functional contexts in which they are
used (see Laponce 1987). Yet Swiss-German’s journey from dialect to lan-
guage has only been partial since it has not completely replaced High German
in oral communication (e.g., the national evening news on Swiss-German
public television is still presented in standard German) and since it lacks a
standardized written idiom. Lest it were to cross the elusive threshold of
acquiring its proper written form, Swiss-German cannot replace High German
completely, regardless of how much it advances in other respects.
Second, as Swiss-German moved closer to being a ‘full’ language, High
German became in some respects more like a foreign language. This does not
apply to syntax, vocabulary and grammatical structure where, paradoxically,
the Swiss-German idiom has on average become marginally more similar to
the standard version, owing to the import of expressions from High German
and to the widespread consumption of German electronic mass media
throughout German-speaking Switzerland (Haas 2000). A sense of High
German being ‘foreign’, however, pervades public perceptions of and attitudes
towards the two idioms. As far back as one decade ago, a study found that
Swiss-German primary school pupils develop strong negative attitudes
towards High German and positive affect towards Swiss-German. They per-
ceive Swiss-German as ‘their’ language and High German as ‘someone else’s’
language. Swiss-German signifies intimacy, community and authentic self-
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expression, whereas High German to some extent carries opposite connota-
tions (Häcki Buhofer & Studer 1993). Other studies came to similar findings
(see Sieber & Sitta 1994; Siebenhaar & Wyler 1997). As standard German van-
ished from many spheres of oral communication, it became psychologically
more alien and remote. In addition, some observers maintain that (especially
younger) Swiss-Germans have become less proficient in standard German
(Wunderli 2001; but see Schläpfer 1994).
In light of all these factors, the German-speaking Swiss find themselves in
a peculiar linguistic position vis-à-vis their northern neighbour. On the one
hand, the Swiss-German idiom is sufficiently distinct from standard German
for a cultural boundary to have crystallized and become internalized. To most
Swiss-Germans, ‘being Swiss-German’ entails unambiguously ‘not being
German’; it means, among other things, not to belong to the same cultural cat-
egory as the Germans and – increasingly so – to speak differently from them.
Yet, on the other hand, because of the relative proximity of the two idioms,
because of the Swiss-Germans’ reliance on High German as their written
idiom and because the two idioms are still to some extent entangled at the
level of oral communication, the cultural boundary between them is neither
unproblematic nor secure. Language separates the Swiss-Germans from the
Germans, but it is also language that keeps them tied together.
Borrowing from Sigmund Freud’s (1991[1922]) well-known terminology,
such situations have the potential to result in a kind of ‘narcissism of minor
difference’ (see also Barth 1969; Tajfel 1982; Cohen 1989). No cultural differ-
ence means the absence of distinct cultural categories and thus cultural secu-
rity. Large cultural difference means cultural boundaries that are strong and
thus perceived as unproblematic and secure. Small cultural difference, by con-
trast, means distinct yet insecure cultural categories. The boundary appears
fragile, triggering a process of continuous self-differentiation and often sub-
conscious fears of insufficient separation from and damaging exposure to 
the other category. Seen in this light, the Swiss-German position vis-à-vis
Germany is fundamentally different from that of the French-speaking Swiss
in relation to France. As standard French-speakers, most Romands are able 
to reconcile a notion of full and unambiguous membership in a wider 
Francophone cultural space, on the one hand, with an equally firm sense of
institutional and political ‘Swissness’, on the other. Swiss-Germans, by con-
trast, are to some extent part of a wider German cultural space, yet cannot fully
belong to it; they must locate themselves inside and outside at the same time.
To complicate matters further, Swiss-German society must walk this cul-
tural tightrope without political backing and without an institutional safety
net, as German-speaking Switzerland has no political expression. The closest
political units ‘downwards’ are the cantons. Most are officially monolingual
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and under the Swiss federal system hold almost all powers in cultural and lin-
guistic matters (Knüsel 1994). At the same time, the German-speaking cantons
are too politically autonomous and fragmented to collectively add up to an
overarching Swiss-German political block of one form or another. The federal
government, by contrast, must remain culturally and linguistically ‘neutral’ so
as not to imperil Switzerland’s internal cohesion. Thus, neither the cantons 
nor the Swiss federation can give political expression to German-speaking
Switzerland qua linguistic region. In many ways this is of course the flipside
of the ‘state without a culture’ coin discussed in the previous section. Just as
the Swiss state lacks a ‘thick’ culture to reinforce its political boundaries, so
German-speaking Switzerland cannot give institutional backing to its cultural
boundaries because it has no institutions of its own.
How, then, does all this affect Swiss-German attitudes towards European
integration? To be sure, EU opponents in Switzerland cannot play the
‘German card’ too overtly, nor can they advance straightforward cultural argu-
ments. On the German factor, the Swiss electorate is too sophisticated to con-
ceive of the EU as a German-led conspiracy. In any event, only very few are
given to the loathing of all things German that has afflicted some sections 
of the anti-EU movement in the United Kingdom. Most importantly, in
Switzerland no countrywide political issue is ever overtly fought on cultural
grounds. In fact, it is near impossible to make logically plausible cultural argu-
ments on any national (i.e., Swiss-wide) issue, given that there is no single
Swiss-wide culture in the ‘thick’ sense of the term. Invoking cultural arguments
would inevitably privilege one cultural region over the others and thus be
potentially divisive. It would be seen as an attempt by one language group to
hijack the Swiss state for its particular cultural ends.
On the issue of ‘Europe’ such sensitivities are especially strong. Conscious
that their anti-EU activism has strained relations between the language
groups, Swiss-German opponents of EU membership have tried hard not to
be seen as anti-Romand and to recruit Francophones into their ranks. Yet to
do so they must try to make a political and economic rather than cultural case,
lest they further alienate a linguistic group whose own cultural position is very
different and much more secure.
In Switzerland, then, the debate over EU membership is rarely framed in
cultural terms. Yet this does not mean that cultural and identity-centred con-
cerns play no role. Rather, the rhetoric of the ‘anti-Europeans’ is underlain by
the recurrent themes of smallness, encirclement, vulnerability and identity loss.
And while they part company with some of their British counterparts who
depict the EU as little more than a German-led colonial project, they nonethe-
less imply – however subtly – parallels between Switzerland’s position vis-à-
vis the EU today and its plight during the Second World War.
the origins of euroscepticism in german-speaking switzerland
© European Consortium for Political Research 2004
650
During the EEA referendum campaign, for example, one of the most hard-
hitting advertisements by the ‘no’ side played on just such fears. Its graphical
style was consciously reminiscent of ‘morale-boosting’ posters during the
Second World War. The advertisement depicted Switzerland as a tiny red-and-
white island amidst a vast gray European landmass from which all other
national boundaries had been erased. It called on Swiss voters to resurrect
their ancient ‘spirit of resistance’ in order to stop defeatists in their midst from
surrendering Switzerland and Swiss ideals to a foreign power in exchange for
a few economic advantages. The central message of the advertisement was
clear: then and now, preserving Swiss values and Swiss identity requires
caution and suspicion when dealing with the outside world. It was not so much
an anti-German message (though that connotation, too, was subtly present) as
a more general warning against unbridled foreign exposure.
Such themes resonate much more strongly among many Swiss-Germans
than among their Francophone counterparts because their cultural position is
different. It is defined by the Swiss-Germans’ cultural separateness from a
much larger (and historically often feared) kin-state to which they are
nonetheless culturally tied. This has resulted in insecure cultural boundaries
of which many Swiss-Germans are highly protective precisely because they
are insecure. Add to this that qua linguistic region German-speaking Switzer-
land has no political expression and no institutional protector. As a cultural
region, German-speaking Switzerland confronts the world alone, for a cultural
region is all it is.
This led the Swiss-German electorate to adopt a cautious approach to
Switzerland’s relations with the outside world, from involvement in foreign
peacekeeping missions and the United Nations (UN) to membership in the
EU.3 Again, the point is not to argue that Swiss-German voters perceive all
these issues to conceal direct cultural threats. Rather, their peculiar cultural
and political position helped condition a generally defensive and often inward-
looking and isolationist stance in large sections of Swiss-German society – a
diffuse sense of vulnerability and a desire to limit exposure to the outside
world. Within the delicate cultural equilibrium that has developed inside
Switzerland, the Swiss-German polity has found a niche that is secure enough
to bolster its otherwise difficult cultural and political position. It resents moves
that could upset this equilibrium or force it out of its niche. Its unease vis-à-
vis the European integration process is one manifestation of this.
The future of Swiss-German Euroscepticism
The German-speaking Swiss inhabit a state without an overarching ‘thick’
culture and a cultural region with relatively precarious boundaries and without
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political support and articulation. In the ways discussed above, each identity
makes the Swiss-German electorate cautious towards the EU. Combine the
two and that effect becomes much stronger still. The divided nature of Swiss-
German identifications has had many beneficial consequences. For while the
two identities – Swiss and Swiss-German – are in permanent tension and deny
each other closure, they also help sustain each other. Moreover, their inter-
play has fostered among the Swiss-German polity a liberal civic ethos that
values pluralism, compromise and accommodation and that makes it treat
Switzerland’s three cultural minority groups with exemplary magnanimity. Yet
the same identity mix has placed the Swiss-German electorate in a peculiar
kind of double bind in its relations with the outside world.
The full picture is of course more complicated. Throughout German-speak-
ing Switzerland (as in the country at large) both cantonal and local attach-
ments are strong (Métral 2001) and they co-determine attitudes towards
European integration. Some German-speaking cantons are much more
opposed to EU membership than others. Further divisions with a bearing on
attitudes towards European integration include those between rural and
urban, old and young, rich and poor, left-leaning and right-leaning, and so on
(Kriesi et al. 1993). Even when it comes to their views on ‘Europe’, Swiss-
Germans are by no means a homogenous block.
Nonetheless, the very high overall rate of opposition to European integra-
tion in German-speaking Switzerland becomes intelligible only in light of the
two main factors discussed in this article: multicultural Switzerland’s civic
foundations and lack of a ‘thick’, state-defining culture, and the Swiss-
Germans’ peculiar cultural and political position. This is compounded by the
fact that the Swiss-German polity has all the general attributes that most
engender hostility towards European integration: wealthy, ‘northern’, numer-
ically in the majority inside a multicultural state and with a successful politi-
cal history. In more than one respect, the odds remain stacked against the EU
in German-speaking Switzerland.
How does all this augur for the future development of Swiss-German atti-
tudes towards European integration? For a start, the four main general pre-
dictors of anti-EU sentiment will continue to apply to Swiss-German society,
and for this reason alone it is set to remain one of the more Eurosceptic con-
stituencies in Europe. Much the same holds true for the nature of Swiss-
German identifications with Switzerland. Because of the multicultural makeup
of the Swiss confederation, these will continue to be mainly civic and 
institutional and thus more likely to clash – or be perceived to clash – with the
EU’s own civic and institutional ambitions. Likewise, the Swiss polity will con-
tinue to lack ‘thicker’ cultural material with which to fortify the boundaries of
its multicultural state against an (actual or perceived) erosion resulting from
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closer integration with its neighbours. Against this backdrop, the development
of the EU itself will be an important variable. The more resolute become the
EU’s own civic aspirations, the more will the Swiss-German electorate per-
ceive it as an identity threat and the stronger will be its determination to stay
outside.
A further factor, clearly, is the perceived economic cost of eschewing the
EU. In this context, the recent bilateral agreements between Switzerland and
the EU (which were negotiated in the wake of the ill-fated EEA referendum
and bring Switzerland economically a great deal closer to the EU) have an
ambiguous role. As many proponents hope, they could help the German-
speaking Swiss ‘train’ for eventual EU membership and demonstrate to them
that closer ties do not produce cultural or political harm. Yet, at the same time,
for Switzerland the bilateral treaties have reduced the economic cost of non-
membership and thus made the economic case for joining less compelling.
What, finally, of the cultural and linguistic situation of the German-
speaking Swiss? With effective moves to ring-fence the status of High German
improbable in the foreseeable future (though not entirely out of the question),
it is more likely than not that the Swiss-German idiom will continue to move
further outwards on the dialect-to-language continuum in sociolinguistic
terms. In such a scenario, Swiss-German would penetrate into more and more
areas of oral communication at the expense of standard German, increasingly
confining the latter to the status of a mainly written idiom. This would further
advance the current transition from social context dependent to ‘medium
dependent’ diglossia discussed earlier. On some accounts, this development
will further benefit from the spread of English as global and European lingua
franca, since this will reduce the relative significance of standard German as
one of the local linguae francae (Brändle 1998). Swiss-German would become
at once more widely used and more clearly disentangled from High German,
as the boundary between them would coincide ever more closely with the sep-
aration between writing and speech.
To be sure, linguistic developments of this kind can never be predicted with
certainty, and they tend to happen slowly, over several generations. It is, more-
over, hard to foresee their political consequences: language does not inevitably
confer social identity and social identity does not inevitably condition politi-
cal preferences and patterns of political organization. All the same, following
the logic outlined in this article, a Swiss-German polity whose cultural bound-
aries become more sharply delineated and more secure might, over time,
become less concerned with protecting these boundaries and more confident
to accept greater exposure to the outside world, ‘Europe’ included. ‘Narcis-
sisms of minor difference’ often fade as the differences become more clearly
articulated and less minor.
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At the same time, this would not necessarily end German-speaking
Switzerland’s plight as a ‘culture without a political home’ – a plight that, as
was argued, has further fuelled its slant towards political isolationism. Here
change is unlikely anytime soon. In the first place, German-speaking Switzer-
land has not become a salient category of social identification for most of its
inhabitants. Their identifications have largely remained divided between the
local communes, the cantons and Switzerland at large (see Métral 2001). This
in turn would seem to rule out a strong identity-driven push for a linguisti-
cally defined ‘meta-regionalism’ in the foreseeable future. Second, while insti-
tutionally backed linguistic regions would give clearer political expression to
the importance of language in Swiss politics, their creation would require the
kind of radical constitutional reconfiguration that the Swiss polity generally
abhors. Finally, aligning language more closely with political structures would
weaken the crosscutting cleavages that many observers – rightly or wrongly –
credit with the stability of the Swiss political edifice.
On balance, then, many German-speaking Swiss will remain leery of Euro-
pean integration. Some signs point towards a gradual softening, but slowly so
and without yet having reached a point of no return. This is not surprising for
a polity that is wealthy, ‘northern’, the numerical majority in a multicultural
state and with a successful political history, and thus has all the attributes that
most engender opposition to European integration. It is still less surprising in
light of the peculiar political and cultural position of the German-speaking
Swiss, belonging as they do to a state without a unifying culture and to a culture
without a state.
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Notes
1. This article focuses on Switzerland’s two main linguistic groups, which together account
for almost 85 per cent of the population. Italian-speakers (most of whom inhabit the
southern canton of Ticino) are the third largest group. In Ticino, rejection of EU mem-
bership is roughly as high as in the German-speaking part of the country. An important
factor in this is the desire by many Italian-speaking Swiss to prevent unrestricted immi-
gration from Italy into Switzerland in order to ensure that Italian immigrants do not out-
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number Switzerland’s ‘native’ Italian-speakers. As for the tiny Rumantsch-speaking pop-
ulation, clear data is hard to come by since it is scattered across the trilingual eastern
canton of Grisons.
2. Incidentally, however, the Francophone Swiss are untypical ‘Latins’ in that they are
almost evenly divided between Catholics and Protestants, as is the Swiss population at
large.
3. Even though it hosts many UN institutions, Switzerland did not join the organization
until 2002, after a narrow majority of Swiss voters had at last approved accession in a ref-
erendum. Reflecting attitudes towards the EU, support for UN membership is much
higher among French-speakers than among their German-speaking counterparts.
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